Once the hot takes to last year's immigration figures cooled, SMF's migration expert Jonathan Thomas offered five more measured insights on what they mean.
Our Back to the future report on the likely future shape of immigration to the UK, written back in May 2019 (when the contours of the UK’s post-Brexit immigration system had yet to be set in stone), suggested that:
“For those uncomfortable with immigrant numbers in the UK, and expecting a return to times past following Brexit, disappointment may await” not least because of “the relaxation of restrictions on non-EU immigrants.”
The UK’s latest immigration figures show that non-EU immigration now dominates the numbers, at 82% of the whole. And, for those uncomfortable with high immigration numbers, disappointment now runs deep.
Here are five different perspectives on last week’s figures:
1. It’s a numbers game for now
To what extent are those who are uncomfortable about immigration bothered by numbers or by a seeming lack of control? We have previously written about how and why the reporting of immigration numbers assumed such prominence in the UK from 2010, the complex recent history of, and factors influencing, the numbers or control question, but also the false binary of this framing.
As the statistical reporting of the migration numbers has resumed post-COVID, one thing has become clear, reinforced once again last week: across politics, the media and public discourse, regardless of whether or not they should be, the numbers are now more than ever the thing. Their regular release is now pure theatre, accompanied by pre-match build-up, post-match analysis and now VAR, which may lead to the score being revised after further review.
All the protestations of ‘nothing to see here, it’s all under control’, and all the explanations and justifications of ‘yes, but’ as to why the numbers are so high (again), only serve to spotlight the numbers even more. There is no escape from the numbers while they tell a story so enthralling to some, and so appalling to others.
2. Geopolitical uncertainty makes it difficult to call this peak migration
Over the last two decades, just when it seems that UK’s immigration numbers will pull back, they surge again. To cease being theatre, the numbers need to top out, to become less ‘Wow!’ Most of the audience will likely then wander off to watch something more interesting.
Based on the last two sets of figures, peak migration is exactly what many migration experts are now calling. There are a few reasons why they see a likely halving of net migration to the UK in the next few years. One part of the rationale is that the large flows from Ukraine and Hong Kong have tapered off, and, it is assumed, will continue to do so.
That might not happen. The most recent figures show that the UK has taken in around 190,000 from Ukraine and 135,000 from Hong Kong. That is a lot. But it could be a lot more. The UK’s offer to Ukrainians is uncapped, and to Hong Kongers is capped at over 5 million. And the scale of future out-migration from Ukraine and Hong Kong is not in the hands of the UK, but of Presidents Putin and Xi.
And, potentially, of someone else who might become president again. Last week The Economist reported the potential far-reaching impacts across many different areas of policy and parts of the globe were Donald Trump to secure a second term. It did not mention the UK immigration figures, but it could have done.
Last week’s figures show that one outcome of President Biden’s foreign policy decisions over Afghanistan has been that Afghanis have been the most common nationality ‘irregularly’ crossing the Channel over the past two years. If Trump were to regain the presidency, who knows that his plans may be. But even a hint that US strategy towards the defence of Ukraine might change in a way that favours Russia’s prosects of capturing much more territory could see the outflows from Ukraine, including to the UK, increase significantly.
But even if Ukrainian flows do now continue to taper off, as we have recently pointed out it may seem rash more broadly to bet on reduced humanitarian migration to the UK over the medium term. Not just because we can never know what else is around the corner. But, also, because we do know that the UK is uniquely exposed, through deep, longstanding connections, to some of the world’s most populous countries – India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh. Countries whose societies span multiple tensions and fault-lines, and contain some of the largest potential people flows in the world. This is one reason why pursuing broader, multilateral, regional responsibility sharing mechanisms for refugees is important for the UK.
3. Bilateral immigration control agreements can work
Yet multilateral agreements take huge time and effort to negotiate and deliver, even if they are feasible. In the meantime, the realities of immigration control can require much quicker decisive action. In the case of the cooperation arrangement between the UK and Albania at the end of 2022, last week’s figures seem to tell a remarkable story.
First, the Channel crossings. From being the number one nationality making the crossing in Q3 2022, Albanian arrivals on this route have since decreased 83% year-on-year. This is the prime reason that overall numbers across this route are showing a reduction of one-third from the same time last year.
Second, returns. Albeit from a very dire starting point – as numbers of irregular migrant returns from the UK had been plummeting in recent years – the slightly better picture presented in the latest figures is mostly about Albania. Across the board, from enforced returns to voluntary returns to returns of failed asylum seekers, the increased numbers of returns, making the figures look at least slightly less bad from an immigration control perspective, seem mostly to be returns to Albania.
4. Protecting the goose that lays the golden egg
The UK’s offer to international students earns it hard money and builds its soft power. It attracts talented people to come to study in the UK and form connections in/with the UK. While they are here, they pay a high level of fees which helps to cross-subsidise study opportunities for local students. They also spend money that helps support local economies, including in some otherwise less thriving parts of the UK.
But the Migration Advisory Committee has previously warned of the adverse consequences of liberalising the international student route to the point where it starts to become a closet immigration route into the UK, and to be used by people other than those whose primary intention is to study here. Recently there has been a huge rise in the numbers of dependants accompanying students to the UK. The latest numbers reinforce that concern.
Almost one-quarter of study-related visas have recently gone to dependants, compared with just 5% four years ago, before the pandemic. Over that time annual numbers of student dependants have surged more than ten-fold, from less than 15,000 to more than 150,000. For Indians they have risen from 2,127 to 43,445, for Nigerians from 1,427 to 60,506.
With all the benefits they can generate, international students coming to the UK have all the hallmarks of the goose that lays the golden egg. But tensions have been emerging. University accommodation is becoming a real pressure point, with stories of UK students who cannot find or afford accommodation near their chosen university. Tens of thousands of dependants of overseas students really don’t help with that. A golden-egg-laying goose should be looked after, not run into the ground. The government’s plan to restrict overseas student dependants to only those accompanying those doing post-graduate research makes sense.
5. A different perspective on the Home Office
The Home Office is routinely condemned as exhibiting a culture of disbelief in its dealings with asylum seekers. Yet the recent numbers of asylum claims it has granted are record-breaking! The exceptionally high grant rate of 75% – the Home Office are believing a lot of claimants – when applied to the recent increase in its decision-making rate, has seen the Home Office grant 38,761 asylum claims in the year to end of September 2023. This is the highest number since records began in 1984, and higher than the previous peak in 2002, back when the Home Office was far more disbelieving and the grant rate was only 34%.
The Home Office is also frequently criticised for not being evidence-based and for being insufficiently accountable in its operating of the immigration and asylum system. Yet each quarter, as with last week, it releases publicly reams of immigration data, statistics, and explanatory commentary addressing all parts of that system. This is regardless of whether that shows the Home Office in the best light or not. Indeed, it often provides key ammunition for those who wish to criticise and hold the Home Office to account.
There are, indeed, many angles to a full and fair consideration of the Home Office’s role and performance at the heart of the UK’s immigration and asylum system. This will be the subject of the SMF’s next major migration report.
